PRODUCTS LIABILITY-WHEN CIRCUMSTANTIAL PROOF CAN
SUPPORT AN INFERENCE THAT A DEFECT EXISTED IN A
MANUFACTURER'S HANDS: A NEW JERSEY DILEMMA-Mraca v.

Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d 599 (1975).
In November of 1967, Thomas Moraca purchased a 1968 Lincoln
Continental from Merlin Motor Company.' Six months later he set
out on a business trip, and at some point during the trip, he heard a
noise in the front of the car. 2 At that moment, the car, not responding to Moraca's steering efforts, veered off the road, struck a tree,
3
and ultimately split into two pieces.
Moraca, having incurred severe injuries, sued both the manufacturer and the retailer, alleging a manufacturer's defect in the steering
mechanism. 4 Evidence adduced at trial established that the car had
traveled approximately 11,000 miles, and that just prior to the business trip, the power steering fluid reservoir had been filled because it
was low. 5 Additionally, a state police officer testified that the physical
evidence showed that the car was "in a side skid" when it left the road
6
and had moved "in a straight line without any turning whatsoever."
Moraca offered expert testimony to establish that two manufacturing defects-a rough bearing surface and a bent sector shaft-had
caused the power steering fluid to leak, thereby resulting in a locking
of the power steering unit. 7 Defendants' experts admitted that "there
would be an audible noise" if fluid were lost from the power steering
unit, but they maintained that there was neither seal damage nor loss
of fluid.' They also stated that the bent sector shaft resulted from the
I Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 132 N.J. Super. 117, 120, 332 A.2d 607, 609 (App. Div.
1974), aff'd, 66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d 599 (1975).
2 Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 458-59, 332 A.2d 599, 601 (1975).
3 Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 132 N.J. Super. 117, 121, 332 A.2d 607, 609 (App. Div.
1974), aff'd, 66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d 599 (1975). Moraca claimed that he released the
accelerator when the car began to slide, but thought that he did not brake while making
an effort to turn the wheel. 132 N.J. Super. at 121, 332 A.2d at 609.
4 Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 456, 332 A.2d 599, 600 (1975).
5 Id. at 458-59, 332 A.2d at 601.
6 Id. at 459, 332 A.2d at 601.
7 Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 132 N.J. Super. 117, 121-22, 332 A.2d 607, 609 (App.
Div. 1974), aff'd, 66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d 599 (1975). Expert testimony revealed that the
rough bearing surface would rub the seal to the point where, finally, power steering fluid
would be lost. 132 N.J. Super. at 121, 332 A.2d at 609. This testimony also established
that the bent sector shaft would result in "eccentric" rotation of the shaft, thereby causing
the seal to stretch, allowing the fluid to escape. Id. at 121-22, 332 A.2d at 609.
8 Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 132 N.J. Super. 117, 122, 124, 332 A.2d 607, 609-10, 611
(App. Div. 1974), aff'd, 66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d 599 (1975). One expert testified that the
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impact of the crash 9 and was therefore not a manufacturing defect.
After presenting this evidence, Moraca requested the trial judge to
charge the jury that he need not prove a specific defect, but only that
the accident resulted from "some defect in the car."' 10 He further
sought a charge which would permit the jury to infer from "the total
effect of the circumstances shown from purchase to accident" that a
product defect caused the accident." The trial judge refused both
requests, stating that they were encompassed in his own charge.' 2
Upon special interrogatories the jury found that there was no defect,
and the trial court "entered a verdict of no cause of action."' 13 Plaintiff
appealed to the appellate division on the ground that the trial court
should have granted his requested charges.1 4 The appellate division,
with one judge dissenting, ruled in favor of the plaintiff15 and reversed
noise would be like that of" 'marbles running down a pipe.' " 132 N.J. Super. at 124, 332
A.2d at 611.
9 Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 132 N.J. Super. 117, 122, 332 A.2d 607, 610 (App. Div.
1974), aff'd, 66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d 599 (1975).
10 Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 456-57, 332 A.2d 599, 600 (1975) (emphasis
added).
11 Id. at 457, 332 A.2d at 600. The requested charges read as follows:
"Nor is the plaintiff required to establish the specific defect that existed in
the product. Rather, in order to recover for breach of warranty, the plaintiff must
present evidence from which it is reasonable to infer or conclude that more
probably than not, the harmful event ensued from some defcet [sic] in the product, whether the defect is identifiable or not, and that the defect arose out of the
design or manufacture of the product or while it was in the control of the defendant, and that the defective product proximately caused injury or damage to the
plaintiff.
"A breach of warranty may be established where the total effect of the
circumstanccs sho.n from purchase to accident is adequate to raise an inference
that the product was defective and that such condition was causally related to the
mishap that occurred."
132 N.J. Super. at 122, 332 A.2d at 610.
12 Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 457, 332 A.2d 599, 600 (1975).
13 Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 132 N.J. Super. 117, 122-23, 332 A.2d 607, 610 (App.
Div. 1974), aff'd, 66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d 599 (1975). The jury also found that the plaintiff
was not contributorily negligent. 132 N.J. Super. at 123, 332 A.2d at 610.
14 Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 132 N.J. Super. 117, 123, 332 A.2d 607, 610 (App. Div.
1974), aff'd, 66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d 599 (1975). Plaintiff had also requested that his
"'circumstantial evidence' " charge be given when the jury interrupted its deliberation
to ask the trial judge whether the defendant manufacturer could circumstantially be
found liable if the jury found no defect and no contributory negligence, but the court
denied this request. 132 N.J. Super. at 122-23, 332 A.2d at 610.
15 Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 132 N.J. Super. 117, 125, 127, 332 A.2d 607, 611, 612
(App. Div. 1974), aff'd, 66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d 599 (1975). The appellate division noted
that at different times in his charge and also in the first special interrogatory, the trial
judge spoke of" 'any defect,' " while at the same time making mention of the "plaintiff's
'contended' for or 'claimed' defect." 132 N.J. Super. at 125, 332 A.2d at 611. This and
other statements by the trial judge led the appellate court to "conclude that the issue of
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and remanded the case for a new trial. 16
The defendants appealed from this decision to the Supreme
Court of New Jersey. 1 7 In Moraca v. Ford Motor Co.,18 the supreme
court agreed with the appellate division that the trial judge had
committed reversible error by failing to include in his charge the
concept that a defect can be established by circumstantial evidence.19
However, Justice Sullivan, writing for the majority, pointed out that
"[t]he real question in this case is whether plaintiff's proofs are suffi'20
cient to invoke application of the circumstantial evidence rule. "
Under that rule, a court will consider particularly " 'the age and prior
usage of the product in relation to its expected life span, durability
and effective operability without maintenance,' " to ascertain whether
a permissible inference can be drawn that a defect in the product
arose in the defendant's hands.21 Applying this rule to the facts of the
case, the court found that "a critical malfunction" of the steering system in a six-month-old Lincoln which had been driven only 11,000
miles should not normally occur if the car had been properly maintained and operated.22 Concluding from "[tlhe totality of the evidence
and circumstances" that plaintiff had also sufficiently negated other
probable causes of the malfunction, the court found that a reasonable
inference could be drawn that such malfunction existed before the car
left the manufacturer's control and, therefore, held that the evidence
was sufficient to support a finding of a manufacturer's defect. 2 3 This
finding appeared to conflict with the seemingly hard-line approach
enunciated only four months earlier by the same court in Scanlon v.
General Motors Corp. ,24 thereby placing in doubt New Jersey's posiliability was submitted to the jury predicated solely upon the specific defects asserted by
plaintiff's experts." Id.
16 Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 132 N.J. Super. 117, 127, 332 A.2d 607, 612 (App. Div.

1974), aff'd, 66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d 599 (1975). Although not discussed by defendants on
appeal or at trial, the appellate court suggested that, on remand, prolonged usage in itself
should not preclude drawing an inference of a manufacturer's defect, and that, therefore,
the issue of the existence of a manufacturer's defect is one for the jury. See 132 N.J.
Super. at 125-26, 332 A.2d at 612.
17 Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 456, 332 A.2d 599, 600 (1975). The defendants appealed as of right which is permitted in New Jersey when there is a dissent in
the appellate division. N.J.R. 2:2-1(a)(2).

Is66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d 599 (1975).
19Id. at 458, 332 A.2d at 601.
20 Id.
21ld. (quoting from Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 593, 326 A.2d 673,
678 (1974)). For a discussion of Scanlon and its implications in light of the supreme
court's decision in Moraca see notes 77-107 infra and accompanying text.

22 66 N.J. at 460, 332 A.2d at 602.
23Id. at 459-60, 332 A.2d at 601-02.
24 65 N.J. 582, 326 A.2d 673 (1974). See notes 77-107 infra and accompanying text.
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tion on the quantum of proof necessary to create a jury issue in cases
of strict liability involving allegedly defective products.
In strict products liability cases, a plaintiff must normally prove
not only that a defect existed and that the product caused the

plaintiff's injury, but also that it existed in the hands of the
defendant. 25 While it is often most difficult to prove by direct evidence the existence of a defect, it is virtually impossible to prove by
the same type of evidence that the defect existed at the time the
product left the defendant's control.2 6 For this reason, a plaintiff will
27
frequently rely on circumstantial evidence to prove his case.
25 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 103, at 671-72 (4th ed. 1971)

[hereinafter cited

as PROSSER ]; Freedman, "Defect" in the Product: The Necessary Basis for Product
Liability in Tort and in Warranty, 33 TENN. L. REV. 323, 327 (1966); Prosser, The Fall
of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 840-42 (1966);
Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Products Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REV. 325, 326
(1971); Note, Proof of Defect in a Strict Products Liability Case, 22 ME. L. REV. 189,
191-92 (1970).
26Forde, Products Liability-Use of Circumstantial Evidence and Inferences To
Prove That a Product Was Defective and That the Defect Existed When the Product Left
Defendant's Control, 1972 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 42, 44, 56. There are several reasons why

direct evidence is very seldom available in such cases. Many times "the product is lost or
destroyed" and other times the product's user may have died from the failure of the
product. Rheingold, supra note 25, at 343. In any case, it is rare that "a person will be
able to testify from his personal knowledge that a particular product was sold in a certain
defective condition." Reader v. General Motors Corp., 107 Ariz. 149, 154-55, 483 P.2d
1388, 1393-94 (1971). See Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 592, 326 A.2d
673, 678 (1974).
27Forde, supra note 26, at 56; Rheingold, supra note 25, at 340.
Circumstantial evidence within the context of products liability is indirect proof
which permits a reasonable inference that, more probably than not, the injury resulted from
a defect which existed in die product whilc it wvas in the hands of the defendant. See
PROSSER, supra note 25, § 103, at 671-73.
Use of circumstantial evidence in strict products liability cases is very similar to the
application of the res ispa loquitur doctrine. Id.; Forde, supra note 26, at 56-60. When res
ipsa loquitur is applied it is necessary that
(1) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence; [and] (2)it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant ....
PROSSER, supra note 25, § 39, at 214.
If these and other conditions are met, then it is reasonable to infer that more probably than not, the accident occurred due to the defendant's negligence. See 1 L. FRUMER
& M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12.03[1], at 285-86 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN]; Waltz, Res Ipsa Loquitur in the Products Liability Field,

36 CLEV. B.J. 261, 261, 280 (1965).
Although neither negligence nor exclusive control may be present in strict products
liability cases involving manufacturing defects, the inferences permitted Linder the classical res ipsa loquitur doctrine have also been recognized to be applicable to these cases.
PROSSER, supra note 25, § 103, at 672-73; Forde, supra note 26, at 56-58. Hence, where
the facts permit it,
a reasonable inference can be drawn that more likely than not a defect
existed in the hands of the defendant. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 103, at 672-73.
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Through circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff in many jurisdictions
need only show the existence of some defect which can be traced to
the defendant. 28 While the very happening of the accident with all its
attendant circumstances may be sufficient in some cases to permit the
required inference, prolonged use 2 9 and other possible causes of an
31
accident 30 may operate to weaken or destroy that inference.
Prolonged use by itself generally does not render the inference
impermissible as a matter of law. 3 2 For example, in Mosier v. American Motors Corp., 3 3 the evidence submitted indicated that a man28

Rheingold, supra note 25, at 328-29. See, e.g., Lindsay v. McDonnell

Douglas

Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 640 (8th Cir. 1972); Sabloff v. Yamaha Motor Co., 59 N.J.
365, 366, 283 A.2d 321, 321, aff'g 113 N.J. Super. 279, 273 A.2d 606 (App. Div. 1971);
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 337-38, 298 N.E.2d 622, 625, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 465

(1973).
Plaintiffs generally do not have to prove a specific defect, but one commentator has
pointed out that there is a problem with applying the term " 'specific.' " He observes:
Taking an example with layers of increasing specificity, it could refer to: (a) the
mechanism that caused a car to go off the road; (b) the mechanism that caused its
steering to fail; (c) the mechanism that caused the tie rod to break; or (d) the
mechanism that caused the steel in the tie rod to fracture.
Rheingold, supra note 25, at 329.
29 This term refers to the "natural deterioration resulting from use and lapse of time."
1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 27, § 11.03, at 211; see id. at 211-12; PROSSER,
supra note 25, § 103, at 674.
30 Included in other possible causes is the possibility of misuse, whether by the
plaintiff or prior users. See PIOSSER, supra note 25, § 103, at 674-75.
31 See id. at 673-74. See also 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 27,
§ 11.03, at
214.4; Rheingold, supra note 25, at 340.
32 See Rheingold, supra note 25, at 340. See, e.g., Pryor v. Lee C. Moore, Corp., 262
F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959) (circumstantial evidence of
defective weld in fifteen-year-old derrick was sufficient to establish a jury question);
Spotz v. Up-Right, Inc., 3 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 280 N.E.2d 23 (1972) (testimony regarding
existence of a defective weld in a fifteen-year-old scaffolding supported finding of defendant liability even though three other causes were possible); Tucker v. Unit Crane &
Shovel Corp., 256 Ore. 318, 473 P.2d 862 (1970) (expert testimony of a defective weld in a
nine-year-old crane was probative of defendant's liability).
Occasionally "the prolonged use factor may loom so large as to obscure all others in a
case." Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 336, 319 A.2d 914, 923 (1974)
(twenty-year-old crane). In such cases a plaintiff's failure to produce other evidence from
which an inference of a defect can be drawn will result in a directed verdict for defendant, since plaintiff's use of the product over an extended period of time will render the
inference that defendant was responsible for the defect unreasonable. See Carney v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 309 F.2d 300, 306 (4th Cir. 1962) (dictum); Hawkeye-Security Ins.
Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672, 681 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1970).
33 303 F. Supp. 44 (S.D. Tex. 1967), aff'd, 414 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1969). The plaintiffs
instituted the action against the manufacturer and seller for, inter alia, breach of implied
warranties, alleging that the accident was caused by a malfunction of the steering
mechanism. 303 F. Supp. at 47-48. For a discussion of the equivalence of actions
grounded in strict products liability and breach of implied warranty see note 55 infra
and accompanying text.
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ufacturing defect in the steering assembly of a car caused it to roll out
of control, thereby injuring the plaintiff passengers. 34 In considering
those factors which might affect the reasonableness of the inference
that a defect existed while the automobile was in the control of the
defendants, the court noted that "eight months and 2,920 miles between the date of purchase and the accident do not render the two so
remote as to negate the" conclusion that a defect existed in the de35
fendants' hands.
Even where the inference that a defect was present while the
product was in the defendant's hands could be strengthened by a
relatively short usage, 3 6 courts assess the possibility that plaintiff misuse may exist. 37 A plaintiff may negate the possibility of such misuse
by presenting evidence describing how the product was used 3 8 or by
indicating that nothing in the evidence shows that misuse is a possible cause. 39 Courts additionally may require that other possible
causes besides plaintiff misuse be negated, 40 but normally the plaintiff
Both the manufacturer and the retailer of a product can be subject to strict
products liability if the product was defective when it passed through their hands. See
Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 590, 326 A.2d 673, 677 (1974); 2 L. FRUMER
& M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 27, § 19 A et seq.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402,
commentf (1965).
34 303 F. Supp. at 47, 51. At the time of the accident, the car swerved from one side of
the highway to the other, rolled over and finally came to a halt. Id. at 47. Several witnesses later testified that they had observed after the accident that a portion of the steering
assemblage had been severed. Id. Experts for the plaintiffs testified that a crack which
had existed for some length of time eventually permitted an essential portion of the
steering mechanism to separate and thereby cause loss of front wheel control. Id. at 49.
This was consistent with plaintiff's testimony that the car had started vibrating and that
it had appeared that the automobile was not going in the direction in which the steering
wheel was being turned. Id.
35 Id. at 51-52. Affirming the district court, the Fifth Circuit stated that at least four
factors appeared to enter into the trial court's decision: (1) the age and usage did not
preclude an inference that defendants were responsible for the defect; (2) nothing indicated improper use by the owner; (3) testimony was given to the effect that there was no
previous accident involving the auto; and (4) the inspection procedures employed by the
defendants were "less than stringent." 414 F.2d at 36-37.
36 PROSSER, supra note 25, § 103, at 673.
37 See, e.g., Franks v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 414 F.2d 682, 685 (5th Cir. 1969);
American Motors Corp. v. Mosier, 414 F.2d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1969); Corbin v. Camden
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 N.J. 425, 434, 290 A.2d 441, 445-46 (1972).
3 See, e.g., Franks v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 414 F.2d 682, 685 (5th Cir. 1969);
Corbin v. Camden Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 N.J. 425, 428, 434, 290 A.2d 441, 442, 445
(1972).
39 See American Motors Corp. v. Mosier, 414 F.2d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1969).
See Caskey v. Olympic Radio & Television, 343 F. Supp. 969, 975 (D.S.C. 1972);
Franks v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 282 F. Supp. 528, 531 (W.D. Tex. 1968), aff'd, 414
F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969); Reader v. General Motors Corp., 107 Ariz. 149, 155, 483 P.2d
1388, 1394 (1971).
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must only overcome those possibilities which are "reasonably
probable." 41 However, it has been held that every reasonably probable cause need not be negated where the affirmative circumstantial
evidence sets apart one of these causes as the more probable cause of
42
the accident.
However, where there is a failure to present any evidence, other
than the fact of the malfunction itself, which would tend to either
negate other possible causes or affirmatively support an inference that
the defect existed in the hands of the manufacturer, the court may
refuse to submit the case to the jury and direct a verdict for the
manufacturer. 43 Larson v. Thomashow 44 serves as an illustration of
this approach. In this case, the defendant in an action resulting from
a two-car collision counterclaimed against the manufacturer of his automobile in strict liability and breach of warranty. 45 The defendant
testified that the drive shaft of his car separated from the rear axle
and dragged along the highway causing the car to come to a gradual
halt. 46 While defendant had left his car to find help, plaintiff crashed
into defendant's car, and as a result plaintiff sued the defendant for
the injuries incurred. 4 7 The defendant's vehicle had traveled 24,000
miles since its purchase 28 months before. Further, it had been "serviced regularly" by the retailer and had been repaired twice by two
different service stations. 4 8 The defendant testified that, as far as he
knew, no work had been performed on the joint of the rear axle and
41 See PROSSER, supra note 25, § 103, at 674.

42 See Spotz v. Up-Right, Inc., 3 Ill.
App. 3d 1065, 1072, 280 N.E.2d 23, 28 (1972). In
this case, the plaintiff was injured in a fall which resulted from the collapse of a scaffold.
Id. at 1067, 280 N.E.2d at 24. He sued the manufacturer of the fifteen-year-old scaffold in
strict liability and introduced evidence to show that the cause of the accident was the
separation of a clamp from a cross brace and that this separation was due to a defective
weld in the original manufacture. Id. at 1067-70, 280 N.E.2d at 24-26. The defendant
contended that the clamp separation could have resulted from other causes besides the
manufacturing defect. Id. at 1070-71, 280 N.E.2d at 26. He suggested, for instance, that
there was evidence of plaintiff misuse and abuse of the product. Id. at 1070, 280 N.E.2d
at 26. Nevertheless, the court stated that "it was not incumbent upon the plaintiff to
disprove all other possible causes" and concluded that
where there is sufficient evidence based upon the testimony of several witnesses
to substantiate the claimed cause of the collapse of the scaffold, a jury question is
presented as it is only necessary that the conclusion arrived at by the jury be
based on an inference that is, itself, reasonable tinder the facts.
Id. at 1072-73, 280 N.E.2d at 28.
4 See Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 287 F. Supp. 906, 910, 913 (D.S.C. 1968); notes
44-53 infra and accompanying text.
4 17 I11.
App. 3d 208, 307 N.E. 2d 707 (1974).
45Id. at 210-11, 219, 307 N.E.2d at 710-11, 716.
6 Id. at 211, 307 N.E.2d at 711.
47Id. at 210-12, 307 N.E.2d at 710-12.
4 Id. at 218-19, 307 N.E.2d at 716.
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drive shaft. 49 The trial court directed a verdict on the counterclaim
against Thomashow and in favor of General Motors, the manufacturer. 50 On appeal, the court noted that a party claiming strict
products liability need not negate other possible causes of a defect, but
would not find for Thomashow on his mere contention that a drive
shaft should not fall out -after24,000 miles of use. 5 1 Rather, it held that
there [was] a complete absence of probative facts upon which a jury
could base a reasonable inference that the drive shaft was defective
52
when it left General Motors' control.
While not required, then, to negate all probable causes of the accident in order to support an inference that some defect existed at the
time the car left the manufacturer's control, Thomashow failed to present any evidence upon which a jury could reasonably draw this critical inference. In reaching its decision the court reaffirmed the
"necessity to produce either direct or circumstantial evidence
that
would allow the jury to draw the reasonable inference that the defect" was present while the product was in the defendant's hands. 53
New Jersey first approached the problem of circumstantial proof
in strict products liability cases in the landmark decision of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.5 4 In that case, plaintiffs, husband and
wife, sued the manufacturer and the retailer on the theory of implied
warranty 55 for injuries sustained by the wife when their car crashed
49 Id. at 219, 307 N.E.2d at 716. The court noted, however, that Thomashow was not
a mechanic and that "no records of any of the repair work [were] introduced into
evidence ... nor did any of the mechanics who performed the work testify." Id.
50 Id. at 218-19, 307 N.E.2d at 716.
51
Id. at 220-24, 307 N.E.2d at 7i7-20.
52 Id. at 222, 307 N.E.2d at 719. The court specifically distinguished Spotz v. UpRight, Inc., 3 I11.App. 3d 1065, 280 N.E.2d 23 (1972), as exemplifying a case where there
was sufficient evidence to establish that a defect existed in the defendant's control. 17 I11.
App. 3d at 222, 307 N.E.2d at 718-19. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
53 17 I11. App. 3d 208, 222, 307 N.E.2d at 719.
54 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
55 Id. at 364-65, 161 A.2d at 73. The plaintiffs also stied on theories of negligence and
breach of express warranty. The negligence claims were dismissed at trial and the case
went to the jury for consideration only of the implied warranty issue. Id. at 365, 161 A.2d
at 73.
The fact that this case was determined on the issue of implied warranty does not
preclude its applicability to a case brought in strict liability. New Jersey has recognized
that the "treatment of the manufacturer's liability to ultimate purchasers or consumers in
terms of implied warranty is simply using a convenient legal device or formalism." Santor
v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64, 207 A.2d 305, 311 (1965). The use of implied
warranty terminology has been the conceptual vehicle for implementing the public policy of placing liability on manufacturers for damages or injuries due to defective products.
Id. at 64-65, 207 A.2d at 311-12. This same purpose is more properly expressed in terms
of " 'strict tort liability.' " Id. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312. The functional relationship of these
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ten days and 468 miles after its purchase. 5 6 No one but the plaintiffs
themselves had driven the vehicle, and neither had it been serviced
nor had it been involved in any accidents prior to the one resulting in
this suit.5 7 At the time of the accident Mrs. Henningsen heard a
noise under the hood. The steering wheel then rotated between her
hands, and the car angled sharply to the right, striking a sign and a
wall. 58 The damages sustained rendered the car "a total loss." 59 At
trial, an expert, whose testimony was later deemed of little probative
impact by the supreme court, stated that a malfunction, which was
"due to [a] mechanical defect or failure," occurred " 'from the steering wheel down to the front wheels.' "60 Upon this evidence, the jury
found for the plaintiffs against both the retailer and the
manufacturer. 6 1 Affirming the decision of the trial court, the New
Jersey supreme court held that
the total effect of the circumstances shown from purchase to accident is adequate to raise an inference that the car was defective and
62
that such condition was causally related to the mishap.
Although this "total effect of the circumstances" approach does not
view any one factor as always controlling, in Jakubowski v. Minnesota
Mining & Manufacturing6 3 the court sought to specify when the lack
of one type of proof might prevent a reasonable inference of defendant responsibility for the defect.
Jakubowski relieved a fellow worker who was operating a grinding machine to which an abrasive disc was attached. 64 While
Jakubowski was operating this machine, the disc broke, striking and
injuring him. 65 He sued the disc's manufacturer for breach of implied
warranty on the theory that his injury had been caused by a defect in
the disc. 66 The trial court granted the defendant's motion for involunterms has been recognized in various jurisdictions. See, e.g., Lindsay v. McDonnell
Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 636 (8th Cir. 1972); Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Suvada v.
White Motor Co., 32 IlI. 2d 612, 617-21, 210 N.E.2d 182, 185-87 (1965).
56 32 N.J. at 364, 368-69, 161 A.2d at 73, 75.
57 Id. at 409, 161 A.2d at 97-98.
58 Id. at 369, 161 A.2d at 75. The sudden veering of the car was confirmed by a bus
driver traveling in the lane next to plaintiff. Id.
59 Id.
so Id. at 369, 411, 161 A.2d at 75, 98.
61 Id. at 369, 161 A.2d at 75.
62 Id. at 409, 161 A.2d at 97 (emphasis added).
6 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964).
64 Id. at 180-81, 199 A.2d at 828.
65 Id. at 181, 199 A.2d at 828.
88 Id. at 179-80, 199 A.2d at 827. The plaintiff also sued in negligence and breach of
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tary dismissal, but the case was reversed by the appellate division. 6 7
In reversing the appellate division, 68 the New Jersey supreme court
delineated the methods by which a plaintiff may establish through
circumstantial evidence that a defect existed in the hands of the defendant. The court held that a plaintiff who cannot rely on direct
evidence to prove that there was a defect for which defendant is responsible may introduce "other evidence which would permit an inference" of this fact. 69 This circumstantial evidence would appear to
be that which has an affirmative effect, since the court also instructs
that when neither direct evidence nor other evidence which could
support this critical inference is available,
it is necessary to negate other causes of the failure of the product
for which the defendant would not be responsible, in order to make
it reasonable to infer that a dangerous condition existed at the time
the defendant had control. 70
A plaintiff, then, can rely on that circumstantial evidence which,
through its own force, points to one cause as being more probable
than another; or he may depend on that circumstantial proof which,
by eliminating other causes, leaves only one possible cause-a defect
for which defendant is responsible.
In analyzing the application of these methods of circumstantial
proof to the facts of this case, the Jakitbowski court determined that
the break in the disc could have resulted from four different possibilities: two causes-manufacturing defect or faulty design-for
which defendant would be responsible; and two causes-mishandling
or overuse-for which defendant would not be responsible. 7 1 Examining the plaintiff's auffirm-nativc evidence, ,,hich cons isted of expert tesexpress warrant', but these claims were dismissed by the trial court, and this decision
was later affirmed by the appellate division on the ground that plaintiff had failed to
present a prima facie case. Id.

The proof required in a products liability suit predicated upon negligence is often
identical to that required in an action grounded upon strict liability. See PROSSER, supra
note 25, § 103, at 671. In addition, one commentator points out that
few lawyers try cases on a strict liability or breach of warranty basis alone, even
if they have a good case. They prefer to present a suit built on negligence, if they
can, in order to make out a case that will lead a jury to award damages.
Rheingold, supra note 25, at 326 n.5. See also Dunn, Preparation And Handling Of
Products Liability Cases: Machinery And Equipment, 32 INS. COUNSEL J. 650, 651
(1965).
67 42 N.J. at 180, 199 A.2d at 827-28.
618Id. at 188, 199 A.2d at 832.
69 Id. at 184, 199 A.2d at 830.
70

Id.

71

Id.

at 186, 199 A.2d at 831.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7: 190

timony, the Jakubowski court found that it did not support the critical
inference that a defect existed while the product was in the
defendant's control. Although the plaintiff's expert testified that the
breaking of the disc could only have resulted from a defect, 7 9 the court
noted that the expert opinion had not taken into account "the manner
and extent of. . . handling" during the prior usage of the disc.7Z The
court observed that, since this disc was a product subject to wear and
tear, it would be "mere guesswork" to draw an inference that the
defect existed prior to sale without considering the manner and extent of the prior use. 74
Since plaintiff failed through expert testimony to establish that a
defect existed in the defendant's hands, the court explained that the
plaintiff could have done so by negating the other possible causes in
this case-misuse and overuse by the plaintiff and by the previous
operator. Plaintiff introduced evidence that he properly used the disc,
but none was introduced to negate the prior operator's possible misuse or overuse. 7 5 This failure, the court held, prevented the drawing
76
of the requisite inference.
In Scanlon v. General Motors Corp. ,77 the New Jersey supreme
court continued its delineation of strict products liability proofs and
offered its most comprehensive analysis in this area. Plaintiff, having
received delivery of a new Impala station wagon from I. J. Demarest,
a dealership for Chevrolet, was injured approximately nine months
later when the car went out of control and collided with a telephone
78
pole.
Scanlon brought a personal injury action grounded in strict liabil72 Id. at 186-87, 199 A.2d at 831.

73 Id. at 187, 199 A.2d at 832.
74 Id. at 184, 186-88, 199 A.2d at 830-32. This disc was found by plaintiff's employer
to be good for only five operations. Id. at 184, 199 A.2d at 830. Hence, the disc's durability was relatively short and increased the necessity to account for "the manner and
extent" of the previous use in order to create an inference based on more than mere
surmise or conjecture. Id. at 186, 199 A.2d at 831; see id. at 187-88, 199 A.2d at 832.
See also Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.I. 582, 595, 326 A.2d 673, 680 (1974).
Chief Justice Weintraub, joined by Justices Francis and Jacobs, dissented from the
majority's requirement in this case that plaintiff present evidence negating the possibilities of mishandling and overuse. 42 N.J. at 188-90, 199 A.2d at 832-33. He maintained
that such possibilities were not "realistically involved" and therefore did not have to be
negated. Id. at 189, 199 A.2d at 833. However, he stated further that even "if we ought
seriously to entertain those possibilities . . . still a jury could readily infer there was no
mishandling" or overuse. Id. at 190, 199 A.2d at 833.
75 Id. at 184, 186, 199 A.2d at 830, 831.
76Id. at 186, 199 A.2d at 831.
77 65 N.J. 582, 326 A.2d 673 (1974).
78 Id. at 587-88, 326 A.2d at 675-76.
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ity against General Motors Corporation, the manufacturer of the Impala, and against the retailer. 79 Scanlon purported to show in his testimony that the car had "malfunctioned violently." 80 He also sought
to prove through his expert witness that a defect in a specific part in
the carburetor caused the malfunction. 8 1 Contrary to this testimony,
defendant entered evidence that this part "was 'intact, undamaged,
and in one piece' " subsequent to the accident. 8 2 Plaintiff also asserted that the Impala had been serviced twice by Demarest prior to
the accident but that Demarest had made no carburetor
adjustments. 8 3 Plaintiff stipulated that he could not say whether anyone else had ever serviced the carburetor, since his wife-not he
-was

84

the car's primary driver.
Upon the evidence entered, defendants' motions for involuntary

dismissal were granted by the trial court, but the appellate division
reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. 85 The New Jersey
supreme court reversed the appellate division and reinstated the trial
court's judgment. 8 6 The court based its reversal on the fact that, although plaintiff had introduced enough evidence to establish the
existence of some defect, 87 plaintiff had failed to establish through
79Id. at 586, 326 A.2d at 675.
s0 Id. at 587-88, 598, 326 A.2d at 675-76, 681. However, it should be noted that the
plaintiff did not speak of any malfunction when he described the accident to the police
officer investigating the occurrence, nor did he mention it when he returned to Demarest, the dealer, six months later. Id. at 588, 326 A.2d at 676.
81 Id. at 588-89, 326 A.2d at 676. The plaintiff's expert did not examine the vehicle or
any of its parts, and therefore his testimony was primarily confined to answering
hypothetical questions. Id. Although the expert never actually stated that the carburetor
.. he thenri7ed that the plastic fast-idle cam broke, jamming the carburetor
as defective,
linkage and keeping the accelerator open to the extent it was open when the jamming
occurred. Id. at 589, 326 A.2d at 676.
82 Id. at 589, 326 A.2d at 676. This was proved by setting out "a chain of possession of
the cam" through photographic evidence and introduction of the cam itself. Id.
Defendant also indicated that the body shop that repaired the wrecked Impala had made
no repairs on the carburetor, and the body shop's owner testified that the car functioned
'all right' " subsequent to its repair. Id. at 589, 326 A.2d at 676-77.
s3Id. at 587, 600, 326 A.2d at 675, 682. See also Petitioner's Brief for Certification and
Second Supplemental Appendix at 3, Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 326
A.2d 673 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Petitioner's Brief].
84 65 N.J. at 588, 326 A.2d at 676.
s165 N.J. at 587, 326 A.2d at 675; Petitioner's Brief, supra note 83, at 1.
8665 N.J. at 601, 326 A.2d at 683.
87 Id. at 598, 326 A.2d at 681. The court specified that to prove that a defect exists a
plaintiff must show only "that 'something was wrong' with the product." Id. at 591, 326
A.2d at 677. "[T]he mere occurrence of an accident" does not satisfy this burden, but
"additional circumstantial evidence, such as proof of proper use, handling or operation of
the product and the nature of the malfunction" may strengthen the inference to the point
of establishing that a defect exists. Id. Also, expert testimony given by one who checked
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direct or circumstantial evidence that the defect was present when the
car was in the defendants' control.8 "
The court in Scanlon first addressed itself to the use of affirmative evidence in establishing the critical inference. Justice Clifford,
writing for the majority, explained that as age increases, various products need maintenance in order to function properly, and therefore,
wear and tear becomes an increasingly possible cause of any malfunction that might occur. 8 9 Age, he pointed out, however, is not at all
times controlling. Rather, "all the evidence," especially the relation
of "the age and prior usage of the product . . . to its expected life

span, durability and effective operability without maintenance," enter
into the determination of whether it is reasonable to infer that an
injury would not have happened at this time in the product's life span
without a defect for which defendant would be responsible. 90 Weighthe product or by one who has an opinion on its design may prove the existence of a
defect. Id. at 591, 326 A.2d at 678.
Applying this reasoning to the facts, the court held that the violent malfunctioning of
the correctly operated Scanlon vehicle was enough to establish the presence of a defect
in the car "at the time of the accident." Id. at 598, 326 A.2d at 681 (footnote omitted).
8s Id. at 599-601, 326 A.2d at 682-83. The court asserted that it could have avoided
the issue of whether the defect was present in the hands of the defendants, since it could
have found that plaintiff, under the circumstances of this case, failed to prove the existence
of the specific defect-a defective cam-w hich he alleged was the cause of the accident.
Id. at 596, 326 A.2d at 680. This theory was "destroyed" by the introduction of the
cam and uncontroverted photographic evidence demonstrating that the cam was not
broken. Id. at 596-97, 326 A.2d at 680-81. Since the plaintiff relied on a single theory,
which had its underlying facts utterly disproved, the court held that the case could have
been dismissed on this point alone. Id.
In Sabloff v. Yamaha Motor Co., 59 N.J. 365, 283 A.2d 321, aff'g 113 N.J. Super. 279,
273 A.2d 606 (App. Div. 1971), however, the New Jersey high court stated that "the
plaintiff is not necessarily confined to the explanation his expert may advance." 59 N.J.
at 366, 283 A.2d at 321. Based on this holding, Scanlon argued that he should not be
bound by his expert's theory. 65 N.J. at 598, 326 A.2d at 681. The Scanlon majority
pointed out, in response, that Sabloff was decided six weeks after the Scanlon trial and
implied that the Scanlon defendants could not have been expected to defend against
any other case but the one based on a specific theory. Id. Thus, the court concluded that
"plaintiff cannot now be heard to argue for reversal on a question foreign to the initial
proceedings." Id.
Notwithstanding this narrow possible ground for reversal, the court chose to analyze
and decide Scanlon as if Sabloff had been decided at the time of the trial. Id.
89 65 N.J. at 593, 326 A.2d at 678. The court indicated, though, that the newness of
even a complicated instrumentality may "justif[y] an inference that the defect arose while
in the control of the manufacturer." Id. at 594-95, 326 A.2d at 679-80 (citing Realnuto v.
Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440 (1974) (five-day-old used car driven approximately 140 miles after purchase); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960) (eleven-day-old car registering 468 miles); and Sabloff v. Yamaha
Motor Co., 113 N.J. Super. 279 (App. Div.), aff'd, 59 N.J. 365 (1971) (two-day-old motorcycle driven approximately 50 miles after purchase)).
90 65 N.J. at 593, 326 A.2d at 678-79 (emphasis added). The court noted that, in
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ing these factors in this case, Justice Clifford noted that an
tomobile is a complicated instrumentality needing maintenance,
pairs, and adjustments, and hence he concluded that because
nine-month-old Scanlon vehicle had traveled 4,000 miles, it could
reasonably be inferred that the defect arose while the car was in
defendants' hands:

aurethe
not
the

[W]e hold as a matter of substantive law that in the circum-

stances of this case the "other evidence" offered does not justify the
drawing of an inference that any defect existed in the hands of the
manufacturer or retailer.91

Plaintiff, although failing to establish that a defect existed in the
hands of the defendants primarily through affirmative evidence, could
still support an inference of this fact through negation of other causes.
Hence, the court next addressed itself to supporting the critical inference solely through negation of other possible causes. Drawing a distinction between complex and simple instrumentalities, the court
reasoned that simple instrumentalities, like the disc in Jakubowski,
do not require expert testimony to help discern other possible causes
of an accident. 92 However, as the instrumentality becomes more
complex, additional causes not readily apparent to laymen must be
considered, thereby necessitating expert testimony which would chart
and negate "the most likely of these" causes. 93 Applying this reasoning to the evidence presented in Scanlon, the majority concluded that
since a car is a complex instrumentality, the plaintiff should have negated "the most likely of these" additional causes. 94 It also concluded
that plaintiff failed to negate even those causes apparent to laymen,
such as improper maintenance 95
exceptional cases, evidence that the defect existed in the hands of the defendant may be
shown by circumstantial evidence without considering the product's age. "For example,
where specifically identified, the nature of such a defect may justify the inference that it

was present while in the manufacturer's control." Id. at 593 n.4, 326 A.2d at 679.
91 Id. at 599, 326 A.2d at 682 (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 594, 326 A.2d at 679. See also Corbin v. Camden Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60
N.J. 425, 290 A.2d 441 (1972).
93 65 N.J. at 594, 600, 326 A.2d at 679, 682.
94 Id. at 600, 326 A.2d at 682.
95 Id. at 600, 326 A.2d at 682-83.
Justice Pashman maintained in a vigorous dissent that requiring the plaintiff to negate other possible causes not apparent to a layman placed an unreasonable burden on
the consumer and was not compatible with the court's trend in following "the liberal and
modern view favoring a jury trial for a purchaser injured in the use of a mass-produced
article." Id. at 604-05, 326 A.2d at 685.
He also contended that the facts surrounding the accident alone were sufficient to
support an inference that a defect existed in the defendant's hands. Specifically, he stated
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In Moraca, the court applied the "circumstantial evidence
criteria" enunciated in Scanlon and found that the evidence presented met those criteria. 9 6 This result was reached despite the fact
that the prolonged-use factor was greater than that in Scanlon.
Seeking to reconcile these seemingly contrary decisions, Justice Sullivan pointed out that the Scanlon circumstances "indicated driver fault
as the real cause," supporting this view with the facts that Scanlon
himself had stated that he had lost control of the car while passing
another car and that Scanlon did not mention any malfunction to the
policeman at the scene of the accident, nor to the retailer six months
later. 9 7 Justice Sullivan explained that, in light of such circumstances,
"plaintiff's naked claim . . . that the carburetor had jammed was insufficient to make out a circumstantial case of some unidentified
98
manufacturer's defect."
Justice Clifford, dissenting in Moraca, maintained, however, that
the proof requirements of Scanlon were more stringent than the majority indicated, and challenged the majority's position with two criticisms. The first was that the critical inference could not be drawn
primarily from the affirmative evidence introduced by Moraca. He
contended that if the critical inference could not be drawn as a matter
of substantive law in Scanlon, where the prolonged use was nine
months and 4,000 miles, then it could not be drawn where the prolonged use was six months and 11,000 miles. 99 Apparently then, he
did not view the affirmative evidence and circumstances of Moraca as
being sufficiently distinguishable from those in Scanlon to justif,
permitting the critical inference in Moraca.
Since the plaintiff failed to establish that some defect existed in
the hands of the defendant primarily through affirmative evidence,
Justice Clifford, following Scanlon's directive, maintained that plaintiff
must submit expert testimony that charts and negates the most likely
causes not apparent to a layman in order to support the critical
inference.' 0 0 Thus, Justice Clifford's second criticism was that Moraca
failed to satisfy this negation requirement, since his "experts did not
that "[s]udden uncontrolled acceleration followed by heavy brake application and 563
feet of skid marks surpass 'mere surmise or conjecture.' " Id. at 605, 326 A.2d at 685.
Recognizing that the plaintiff's case could have been stronger, he reminded the majority
that any "[w]eakness in plaintiff's case and factors favorable to the defense are for the
jury to evaluate as to weight and credibility." Id.
96 66 N.J. at 460, 332 A.2d at 602. See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text.
97 66 N.J. at 460, 332 A.2d at 602.
98 Id.

9 Id. at 465, 332 A.2d at 605.
100 Id.
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even refer to any other possible causes, much less undertake to discount them.'' 101
Justice Sullivan's analysis does not seem to answer Justice
Clifford's criticisms, nor does it adequately reconcile the two cases.
Nowhere in Scanlon does the court specifically say that indications of
10 2
driver error prevented a drawing of the requisite inference.
Rather, the import of Scanlon was that the plaintiff had failed to introduce any evidence which through its own force would support an
inference that a defect existing in defendant's hands was the more
probable cause of the accident. Such evidence did exist in Moraca.
Affirmative circumstantial evidence, such as wheel lockage, and a
noise under the hood, 10 3 was presented which, unlike the evidence in
Scanlon, diminished the effect of prolonged use and made it more
reasonable to conclude from "all of the evidence" that a defect existed
while the product was in the control of the defendant. ' 0 4 Thus, to the
extent that both Scanlon and Moraca utilize the "circumstantial evidence criteria," and to the extent that the facts are distinguishable,
the two cases are reconcilable.
Viewed from this perspective, Justice Clifford's first criticism,
which evinces a very narrow reading of Scanlon's circumstantial evidence criteria, can be easily dealt with. Since most courts agree that
prolonged use is not usuallv dispositive, but is merely one factor to
be considered in judging whether the critical inference can be
reasonably drawn, and, in this case, there was affirmative evidence
which tended to set apart a defect for which defendant is responsible
as being the more probable cause of the accident, the majority seems
05
to have the better result.'
101Id. Neither in the majority opinion nor in the briefs of either party was any
indication given that plaintiff's experts referred to other possible causes of the accident.
See id. at 456-61, 332 A.2d at 600-02; Brief and Appendix for Defendant-Appellant at 5-8,
Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d 599 (1975); Brief and Appendix for
Plaintiff-Respondent at 6-7, Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d 599 (1975).
102 66 N.J. at 463, 332 A.2d at 604 (Pashman, J., dissenting). See 65 N.J. at 600, 326
A.2d at 682-83.
103 See 132 N.J. Super. at 120-22, 332 A.2d at 609-10; notes 2, 3 & 6 supra an(
accompanying text.
104 66 N.J. at 459-60, 332 A.2d at 601-02.
10- See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
Justice Pashman, who concurred in the result in Moraca, suggested a different point
of view. He found that the court's reasoning in both Moraca and Scanlon invaded the
province of the jury. See note 95 supra. He would relegate the court's role simply to
"deternin[ing] whether the existence of a defect while the product was under the control
of the manufacturer . . . [is] something more than mere 'guess or speculation.' " 66 N.J. at
462, 332 A.2d at 603.
The whole thrust of the Scanlon opinion and the implication of Moraca is that some
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Having succeeded in supporting the critical inference through
primarily affirmative evidence, plaintiff Moraca, in accordance with
Scanlon, did not have to rely solely on the negation of other causes to
sustain the critical inference. Thus, the Moraca court did not have to
reach the question of whether the evidence of negation of other
causes was sufficient to permit a reasonable inference in Moraca.
However, the majority maintained that, besides supporting a reasonable inference through primarily affirmative evidence, plaintiff had
also sufficiently negated "other likely causes" as the source of the defect and seemed to say that it was reasonable to infer from the negation alone that a defect was present in the automobile when it was
still in the defendant's control. 10 6 If this was the implication of the
court, it clearly violated Scanlon's mandate that, where there is prolonged use involving a complicated instrumentality, and where the
critical inference cannot be drawn primarily from the affirmative evidence offered, there must be expert testimony which outlines and
negates causes not apparent to a layman. Plaintiff's expert failed, as
had Scanlon's, to do just that.' 0 7 Thus, Justice Clifford's objection to
this portion of the majority's opinion is well founded. It remains to be
seen, however, whether the real import of this part of the Moraca
holding is that Scanlon is overruled sub silentio, or that the court is
simply revealing an uncertainty on the negation requirements it
should impose where evidence of negation might be the only type of
evidence plaintiff has to offer.
The Moraca decision indicates that New Jersey still maintains a
position that looks to the "total effect of the circumstances," and not
just merely to prolonged usage and the complexity of the product, in
order to support an inference that the defect existed in the hands of
the defendant. Had the Moraca court simply stated that the affirmative circumstantial evidence presented, despite the existence of prolonged usage and the complexity of the product, would alone have
supported the inference that a defect existed in the defendant's
hands, it could have avoided the discussion about the negation of
cases, without the introduction of substantial evidence, fail to create an inference that is
not based on "mere guess or speculation." See notes 91-94, 96-98 supra and accompanying text. Unless Justice Pashman was suggesting that a case be sent to the jury upon the
sole showing of the existence of a defect without establishing that such a defect existed in
the defendant's hands, the difference with the majority's reasoning seems only to be a
matter of degree in the required quantum of evidence necessary to make an inference
reasonable.
10666 N.J. at 459-60, 332 A.2d at 601-02.
107 See notes 100-01 supra and accompanying text.
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other possible causes and alleviated the disparity between Moraca
and Scanlon. Hopefully, the court in future cases will resolve the
inconsistency between these two decisions.
Richard P. Maggi

